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NOTES AND COMMENTS
umes contain the working library for the students, and 2,000 more
volumes are available in the reserve stacks reached through the
delivery desk, which is situated in the center of the back wall. In
one corner of the reading room arches lead to the browsing room,
fitted with floor lamps and comfortable chairs, and stocked with
current legal periodicals, newspapers, special collections, and books
for recreational reading of a semi-professional type.
The delivery desk furnishes direct access to the library stack
wing, in addition to the librarian's office, work room, cataloguing
room, students' typing room, and and a room especially located and
equipped for the convenience of visiting attorneys who desire to
use the facilities of the library There are five tiers of stacks,
with a total capacity of approximately 160,000 volumes, leaving
ample room for expansion of the present library of 60,000. A full
size automatic elevator, an electric book lift, and inter-stack phones
insure efficient page service in the delivery of volumes.
Built to accommodate years of growth and expansion, the build-
ing affords a permanent home which incorporates the latest ideas
and facilities to be found m the best of approved law schools.
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PRovABiLiTY OF CILAIIS FOR FUTURE RENT OR DAMAGES AGAINST
THE TRUSTEE IN BANKRUPTCY OR A RECEIVER OF AN INSOLVENT
TENANT UPON ABANDONMENT OF THE LEASED PREMiSES, MEASURE
OF DAMAGES IN FEDERAL COURT RECEIVERSHIPS. After publication
of the article' appearing under the above title in the November
issue of the LAw REviEw, a deelsion 2 was handed down by the
United States District Court for the Western District of Washing-
ton, Northern Division, which justifies this supplemental note writ-
ten at the request of the LAw REvIEw
(a) The title in the November issue of THE REVIEW should read as it
appears above--"Provability of Claims for Future Rent or Damages * * *"
instead of "for Damages"- (b) The quotation from the case of Hives
Yellow Pine Trustees v. Martin, 268 U. S. 458, 69 L. Ed. 1050 (1925)
appearing in footnote 15, p. 310, is incomplete, the proper quotation being
as follows:
"Both the meaning of statutes of a state and the rules of
the unwritten law of a state affecting property within the state
are peculiarly questions of local law, to be ascertained and estab-
lished by the state courts. For that reason Federal courts ordi-
narily hold themselves bound by the interpretation of state
statutes by the state courts. * * *
'When questions affected by the interpretation of a state
statute or a local rule of property arise in a Federal court, that
court has the same authority and duty to decide them as it has to
decide any other questions which arise in a cause; and where
state decisions are in conflict, or do not clearly establish
what the local law is, the Federal court may exercise an inde-
pendent 3udgment and determine the law of the case. * * *"
2Republic Supply Company of California v. Richfield Oil Company of
California, Cause No. 793, decision by Judge Jeremiah Neterer, District
Judge, on exceptions to a Special Master's findings and conclusions on
proof of claims based upon disaffirmance of leases, decision filed Decem-
ber 14, 1932.
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The facts of the case are briefly as follows In January, 1931,
the Richfield Oil Company of California went into the hands of a
receiver, ancillary proceedings being instituted in the State of
Washington at the same time. In April, 1931, the receiver dis-
affirmed several leases of filling stations, disaffirmance becoming
effective April 30, 1931, to which date rent was paid in full. Claims
were filed for damages sustained from April 30, 1931, to the end of
the lease terms, the unexpired terms being of various lengths, up
to 12 years.
A Special Master was appointed by the district judge to hear
proof of claims, all of which were referred to him.3 In proof of
claims based on disaffirmance of leases, expert testimony was
offered to show the damages sustained, namely, the difference
between the rentals reserved in the leases for the unexpired terms,
and the rental value of the premises for the same period, follow-
ing Oldfield v. Angeles Brewing & Malting Campany,4 reviewed
in the previous article. The rental value for the balance of the
lease terms was less than 50 per cent of the rental provided for
in the leases. An outstanding realty expert called by counsel for
the receiver could not controvert much of the testimony, but testi-
fied that present conditions were abnormal, that rental values
would revive with improved economic conditions, that testimony
as to future rental value was speculative and conjectural. He
was inclined to agree with claimants' experts that no marked
improvement in rental values could be expected within three years.
The Special Master concluded in each case that--- 'the claimant
has failed to establish by any evidence acceptable to the Special
Master any damage sustained beyond the period of three years,"
and-"that the amount which may be received by the claimant
from and after said date of May 1, 1934, has not been established
with a sufficient degree of accuracy to satisfy the mind of the
Special Master." Damages for the period of the unexpired terms
subsequent to May 1, 1934, were disallowed.
Upon the filing of the Special Master's findings of fact and
conclusions of law in the United States District Court exceptions
thereto were taken by three claimants5 whose leases had been dis-
affirmed. The unexpired terms of claimants' leases ran respec-
tively until September 20, 1937, August 31, 1940, and December
31, 1943. The principal ground of the exceptions in each case
was the allowance of damages for a period of three years only, to
May 1, 1934 instead of for the full term to the expiration of the
lease. It was contended that this conclusion was without precedent
and contrary to the rule of the Oldfield case.
The district court in handing down its decision affirmed the
rule that federal courts follow decisions of the state courts as to
the measure of damages in cases of this sort, as outlined in the pre-
' The Honorable Clay Allen, recently appointed Judge of the Superior
Court for King County.
77 Wash. 158, 137 Pac. 469 (1913).
'George Goodner, claim No. W139" B. F Reed, claim No. W216, Admin-
istration Improvement Company claim No. W127A.
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ceding article,6 held that the burden rested upon the claimants to
prove the damages for the unexpired terms of the lease', and said.
"Claimants cannot hope to recover damages which have
not been proven by something of relevant consequence,
and not be vague, uncertain, incompetent, or irrelevant,
not carrying the quality of proof, or having the fitness to
produce conviction and be such that reasonable persons
may fairly differ as to whether or not it proves the fact
in issue. Some substantial evidence must be presented to
carry conviction to establish the fact.8 The- chancellor
may judicially know that prevailing economic forces
have interrupted normal conditions and have affected
every material economic level."
The court then held that as to proof of damages for the period
subsequent to May 1, 1934--
"The burden not being sustained, the Master could not
speculate, nor can the court supersede this finding. '* *
"This, as the other claims, does not present testimony
carrying a quality of proof, or having fitness to produce
conviction of any damages beyond this period.'' 9
Citing Hines etc. v. Martin, supra (note 1) Oldfiele v. Angeles, etc.
Co., supra (note 4) Brown v. Hayes, 92 Wash. 300, 159 Pac. 89 (1916)
Munson v. Balcwzn, 88 Wash. 379, 153 Pac. 338 (1915) Note, however,
that one of the courses open to a lessor in Washington, upon breach of a
lease, was cut off, namely, the right to treat the lease as still m force,
and collect rental each month when it accrues. Judge Neterer said:
"The local law also provides that the lessor may refuse to
accept the disaffirmed leased property and hold the lessee to
the term of the lease, and this, one of the lessors, at the incep-
tion, elected to do, and declined to take the property and mitigate
the damage. The Master is right in holding this he should have
done. The receiver and the lessor stand in a different relation
than lessor and lessee; especially so when a lessor is related to
the business, as is claimant, and can take over the station, and
in good conscience should do so. The receiver is the officer of
the court, and the function of a court of equity is to speedily
determine the controverted issues between the parties. The
court, through its receiver, cannot engage in extended merchan-
dising; it must decree rights and distribute benefits as speedily
as may be done agreeable to equity, to protect the interest of
all parties, and the lessor may not force the court to sell a long-
time lease and sacrifice the beneficial interest, perhaps to be
secured by the lessor at a sum greatly disproportionate to its
value by reason of overruling economic forces, and pay the
present worth of the monthly installments."
Citing Bradbury v. Higgins (Cal.), 123 Pac. 797 (1912).
Citing United States v. Chas. A. Kerr decided November 14, 1932(Ninth Circuit) United States v. Hill, decided November 21, 1932 (Ninth
Circuit) Pennsylvania Steel Co. v. New York City Ry. Co., 198 Fed. 721(1912) Leo v. Pearce, 54 Fed. (2d) 92 (1931) 57 Fed. (2d) 40 (1932).
a In awarding damages to May 1, 1934, the court further held that the
allowance must be for the present worth of each claim inasmuch as the
damages accrued monthly up to May 1, 1934. To fix the total damages
the court applied the following formula:
"Last sum due + first sum due
X Rate X Time = Interest.
2
Interest + principal sum = Total damages. The present worth
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This result is open to the criticism that the expert testimony
had been offerd not to show a future rental value, which would
concededly be speculative and conjectural, but to show the present
rental value of the premises from the date of adjudication'0 to
the end of the lease term, to-wit, the amount which the lessor could
secure as rental if he entered into a new lease for the unexpired
term. That the "market value" of the balance of the term is a
determinable fact is clearly shown by the execution of long term
leases for similar properties similarly located, even at present de-
flated rental values. The values of these leases may be determined
by the same experts who testified in the cases here considered. A
fact established for the purposes of the business world should be
sufficiently proven for the purposes of the courts."-
In Leo v Pearce Stores Co.,12 discussed in the previous article,
the Judge of the United States District Court in Michigan met this
point by saying that the evidence of value (expert testimony) for
the full balance of the term does not "indicate the fair rental value
of such premises during such future period," and by holding that
it was the "duty" of the lessor to rent for a shorter period during
this time of abnormally low values,-a new and rather startling
theory, giving rise to numerous practical objections. Under what
economic circumstance does this "duty" arise? Who is to deter-
mine the length of the period for which the lessor is justified in
re-renting, and by what method is this to be determined 9
The Special Master and the district judge in the cases under dis-
cussion reached substantially the same result by a different and
more concrete route, in limiting proof of damage to a period for
which the opinion of experts was convincing. We suspect that a
new rule is emerging out of the extraordinary circumstances of the
present day NORMAN MV. LrTTELLb.
may be computed by the formula set out in Aetna Life Ins.
Co. v. Geher 50 Fed. (2d) 657, which would be:
Total damages - (Times X Rate of interest + 1) = Present
worth."
1o Damages for the period from date of disaffirmance to date of adjudi-
cation are proved by showing what rentals, if any, were received by the
lessor. Curran v. Smith-Zollinger Co., 157 Atl. 432 (1931).
11 Neither of the decisions referred to in this note discuss the sufficiency
of a bona fide lease for the balance of the term as evidence of rental value,
no such lease having been presented in either case. It is believed that a
court could not resist the convincing force of such evidence, Judge Tuttle's
language in Leo v. Pecce Stores Co. as to the lessor's "duty" to rent for
a shorter period, to the contrary notwithstanding. See Curran v. Smith-
Zollinger Co., cited in note 10, in which the Delaware Chancery Court
said: "Where the lessor, after abandonment of the lease by a receiver of
the lessee, has re-let the premises for the balance of the term at a lower
rent the damages provable against the receivership estate are measured
by the difference between the rent stipulated in the abandoned lease during
the balance of the term and the rent specified in the new one as payable
over the corresponding period."
"Cited in note 8, and quoted pp. 316-17, November issue of THF
WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW.
